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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
JEFFERY RUSSELL FINLAYSON, : Case No. 20000744-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Jeffery 
Russell Finlayson, ["Mr. Finlayson"], by and through his counsel of record, submits this 
Petition for Rehearing of his appeal from a sentence for rape, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1999), and forcible sodomy, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403(2) (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Judge, presiding. Following briefing and oral argument, this Court issued its opinion in 
State v. Finlayson, 2002 UT App 36, on 14 February 2002, affirming the sentence.1 
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
On appeal, the following rules, statutes, and constitutional provisions were 
misapplied or misconstrued: 
1
 A copy of this Court's opinion is attached in Addendum A. 
The Fifth Amendment: 
.. . nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
Article 1, section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Const., art. 1 § 7. 
Utah Code Annotated section 77-18-l(6)(a): 
. . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which 
have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and 
the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the 
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999). 
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
Utah R.Crim. 22(e) (2001). 
Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless 
otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order 
is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall 
be executed. 
Utah R.App. 30(b) (2001). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Considerations of due process, Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure support the 
sentencing court's resentencing of Mr. Finlayson after one count of his three-count 
conviction was reversed. Further, the court did not lack jurisdiction to perform this task. 
As recognized by federal courts, a sentencing court usually "will craft a disposition in 
which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan." United States v. 
Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989). Accordingly, "whenever a reversal on 
appeal undoes a sentencing plan, or even calls the plan into question, the district court 
should be invited to resentence the defendant on all counts in order to achieve a rational, 
coherent structure in light of the remaining convictions." United States v. Bentley, 850 
F.2d 327, 328-30 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing cases). Because the number and severity of the 
counts of a multi-count conviction affects the overall sentence, due process compels 
resentencing when a conviction is partially reversed. 
Under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a sentencing court 
always has jurisdiction to correct an erroneous sentence. Utah R.Crim. 22(e) (2001). In 
this case, the sentencing court did precisely that. After Mr. Finlayson's aggravated 
kidnaping conviction was reversed, State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^ [35-37, 994 P.2d 
1243, the court needed to correct the original sentence, judgment, and commitment 
because it included an erroneous conviction. 
The sentencing court's actions are further supported by Rule 30(b) of the Utah 
3 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 30(b) requires a district court to execute the judgment 
of the appellate court. In reversing the aggravated kidnapping conviction, the Utah 
Supreme Court did not give sentencing instructions or otherwise indicate how its 
judgement affected the sentence. Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, ^ [35-37. Thus, it fell to the 
sentencing court to perform this task. 
Finally, a harmlessness analysis does not apply to the sentencing court's failure to 
comply with section 77-18-l(6)(a) of the Utah Code. Section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires a 
sentencing court to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report 
either by granting additional time for correction, or by making findings of relevance or 
accuracy. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999). A harmlessness analysis has never 
applied to violations of 77-18-l(6)(a) in the past,2 and such an analysis should not be 
applied now. Importantly, the presentence investigation report is significant not only in 
sentencing, but also in future hearings conducted by the Board of Pardons and Parole3 
and even in other criminal cases.4 Thus, even if Mr. Finlayson's sentence was "fully 
consistent with both the evidence and the gravity of the offenses," Finlayson, 2002 UT 
App 36, this case should, at least, be remanded for findings required by section 77-18-
l(6)(a). 
2
 See State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, fl3-15, 6 P.3d 1133 (without applying harmlessness 
analysis, court remanded for findings in accordance with section 77-18-1). 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) (1999). 
4
 Utah R.Evid. 404(b) (Supp. Oct. 2001). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CONSIDERATIONS OF DUE PROCESS AND RELEVANT RULES OF 
PROCEDURE COMPEL A FINDING THAT THE SENTENCING COURT 
HAD JURISDICTION TO RESENTENCE MR. FINLAYSON 
In finding that "the trial court may not have had jurisdiction to resentence" Mr. 
Finlayson, State v. Finlayson, 2002 UT App 36, this Court overlooked several points of 
law. After Mr. Finlayson's conviction for Aggravated Kidnaping was reversed by the 
Utah Supreme Court, State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,1J35-37, 994 P.2d 1243, the due 
process provisions of the United States and Utah Constitutions required the sentencing 
court to resentence him. Further, under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a sentencing court has jurisdiction to "correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R.Crim. 22(e) (2001). Third, 
Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a trial court to execute the 
judgment or order of an appellate court, Utah R.App. 30(b) (2001), and resentencing was 
necessary for compliance. 
Due process required resentencing in this case because the integrity of the original 
sentence was compromised by the reversal of the Aggravated Kidnaping Charge. As the 
federal courts have recognized: 
[W]hen a defendant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a 
strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in which the 
sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan. When the 
conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common 
sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what 
remains in light of the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing 
architecture upon remand, within applicable constitutional and statutory 
5 
limits, if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still 
fits both crime and criminal. 
United States v. Pimienta-Redondo. 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989). Specifically, 
[I]f illegal sentences in the original package foil the district court's original 
plans, the court may start anew and arrive at a punishment no more severe 
in aggregate than the first. Our court has concluded that whenever a 
reversal on appeal undoes a sentencing plan, or even calls the plan into 
question, the district court should be invited to resentence the defendant on 
all counts in order to achieve a rational, coherent structure in light of the 
remaining convictions. 
United States v. Bentlev. 850 F.2d 327, 328-30 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing cases). 
The need to bring Mr. Finlayson's sentence into harmony with the number of 
counts of his conviction and the severity of those counts is also inherent in Utah case law. 
It is basic that a defendant is entitled to federal and state "due process protections during 
sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness." State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 
1994). Part of due process protection is that a sentence should be based upon "accurate 
and reasonably reliable information." State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273, f 8, 12 P.3d 
110. When part of a multi-count conviction is reversed, the informational foundation of 
the original sentence changes. Depending upon the circumstances, the justification for 
imposing a sentence enhancement may be gone, one or more convictions may be gone, 
the severity of the counts may be altered, or the applicable sentences themselves may 
have changed. In each of these circumstances, the overall sentencing plan must be 
reassessed to ensure "that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal." Pimienta-
Redondo. 874 F.2d at 14. 
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In this case, due process mandated the reassessment of the overall sentencing plan 
after one count of Mr. Finlayson's three-count conviction was reversed. There is nothing 
to indicate that the aggravated kidnaping charge did not contribute to the overall 
sentencing plan, or that the reversal of this charge did not alter the factors considered by 
the sentencing court in pronouncing sentence. To the contrary, the original sentence 
mandated that ten years of Mr. Finlayson's prison sentence must be served, and this was 
based upon the aggravated kidnaping charge. R. 891 [911]. Resentencing was necessary 
to allow the sentencing court to "resentence the defendant on all counts in order to 
achieve a rational, coherent structure in light of the remaining convictions." Bentley, 850 
F.2d at 328-30. 
Even if nothing else needed to be done, the sentencing court needed to resentence 
Mr. Finlayson in order to correct the original sentence, judgment, and commitment. The 
original sentence contained an erroneous sentence for aggravated kidnapping, and Rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the sentencing court to "correct an 
illegal sentence . . . at any time." Utah R.Crim. 22(e) (2001). There is nothing to indicate 
that this case constituted an exception to the rule. 
Finally, resentencing was necessary under Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This rule indicates: 
If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless 
otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order 
is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall 
be executed. 
7 
Utah R.App. 30(b) (2001). Under this Rule, the sentencing court was obligated to 
resentence Mr. Finlayson in order to execute the judgment of the Utah Supreme Court. 
After reversing one count of the three-count conviction, the Court did not give sentencing 
instructions or otherwise indicate how its judgment affected sentence. Finlayson, 2000 
UT 10, f 35-37. It therefore fell to the sentencing court to perform this task pursuant to 
Rule 30(b). 
In light of due process, Rule 22(e), and Rule 30(b), the sentencing court's 
rensentencing of Mr. Finlayson should not be censured by this Court, and a finding of 
jurisdiction should be issued. 
II. BECAUSE A HARMLESSNESS ANALYSIS DOES NOT APPLY TO A 
SENTENCING COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 77-
18-1. THE RESULT OF THIS APPEAL SHOULD NOT DEPEND UPON A 
FINDING OF PREJUDICE 
The crux of this appeal is the sentencing court's failure to make findings of 
accuracy or relevancy regarding Mr. Finlayson's objections to information in the 
presentence investigation report. The sentencing court's oversight violated section 77-18-
1 of the Utah Code, which provides: 
. . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which 
have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and 
the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged 
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the 
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record. 
8 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999). If a sentencing court fails to comply with this 
statute, the sentence must be reversed and the case remanded for compliance with section 
77-18-l(6)(a) and resentencing. State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1075 (Utah 1993) 
(superseded on other grounds). Alternatively, the case must be remanded for 77-18-
l(6)(a) findings. State v. Veteto. 2000 UT 62, f l5 , 6 P.3d 1133; State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 
1,145, 973 P.2d 404. 
In any case, violations of this statute are not subject to a harmlessness analysis.5 A 
harmlessness analysis has never applied to violations of 77-18-l(6)(a), nor should it 
apply. To show that a sentencing court's failure to comply with 77-18-l(6)(a) was 
harmful, a defendant would have to show that, even though the sentencing court 
reviewed the presentence investigation report and used it in pronouncing sentence, the 
court did not rely upon it in pronouncing sentence. "[T]he burden of proving a negative is 
almost impossible to meet," Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1073, and it is unfair and unreasonable 
to impose this burden in these circumstances. 
The presentence investigation report follows a defendant throughout his term of 
incarceration. It is used by the Board of Pardons and Parole in evaluating a defendant at 
5
 See Veteto. 2000 UT 62,113-15 (without applying harmlessness analysis, court 
remanded for findings in accordance with section 77-18-1); Jaeger. 1999 UT 1,141-45 (without 
applying harmlessness analysis, court remanded for findings in accordance with section 77-18-
1); Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1072-73 (without applying harmlessness analysis, court reversed 
sentence and remanded for findings and resentencing). See also Criminal Law, 21A Am Jur 2d § 
806 ("On-the-record compliance with [the requirement that findings must be made] is 
mandatory, and where absent, a reviewing court will remand for findings or determinations 
pursuant to the Rule 32(c)(3)(D).") 
9 
hearings and for parole eligibility.6 It affects the programs and therapy for which a 
defendant qualifies. Id It may even be relevant if a defendant is later charged with or 
convicted of another crime.7 Thus, even if errors in a presentence investigation report did 
not prejudice the sentence itself, a remand is required for findings of relevance or 
accuracy. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,1(45. 
Further, the record shows in this case that the sentencing court received the 
presentence investigation report, reviewed the report, and relied upon it in pronouncing 
sentence. R. 1071 [5, 14, 18]. There is nothing to indicate that the sentencing court 
somehow overlooked the Official Version of the Offense located at the beginning of the 
report, R. 929 [2], or that the court did not in any way rely upon it. In fact, the court 
indicated its general reliance upon the report, R. 1071 [18], and indicated it had reviewed 
6
 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) ("The contents of the presentence investigation 
report, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404^/9 ? 9) 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided 
by rule of the Judicial Counsel or for use by the department.") (emphasis added). 
7
 See Utah R.Evid. 404(b) (Supp. Oct. 2001) (Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial."). See also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 
57, ^ [27, 993 P.2d 837 (Evidence of prior burglary at Draper Payless Shoe Store was properly 
admitted to establish identity of victim's killer where two burglaries were remarkably similar 
and aspects of the crimes suggested the same perpetrator had committed both); State v. Baker, 
963 P.2d 801, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Evidence of prior sexual conduct with defendant's wife 
was properly admitted where the conduct "was strikingly similar to the conduct to which H.H. 
testified she was subjected . . . . " ) . 
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the facts of the case, R. 1071 [5], which were summarized in the Official Version of the 
Offense. Thus, inaccuracies in the report justify, at least, a remand for findings as 
required by section 77-18-1. 
Notwithstanding, this Court did not reverse the sentence or even remand for 
findings in accordance with section 77-18-1. Instead, this Court based its affirmance on a 
finding that Mr. Finlayson was not prejudiced by the sentencing court's "failure to 
resolve inconsistencies between the trial testimony and the official version of the offense 
in the pre-sentence investigation report." Finlayson, 2002 UT App 36. This Court also 
indicated that "[t]he sentence imposed is fully consistent with both the evidence and the 
gravity of the offense." Id. 
However, whether the sentence is consistent with the evidence and gravity of the 
offense is not at issue. At issue is the sentencing court's failure to resolve factual 
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, as required by section 77-18-1, and 
how this oversight affected Mr. Finlayson's sentencing and will affect his future board 
evaluations. This case should, at least, be remanded for such findings. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Finlayson respectfully requests rehearing of his appeal, 
and a reversal of his sentence with a remanded to the sentencing court for appropriate 
findings and resentencing. Alternatively, Mr. Finlayson requests a remand for findings in 
accordance with section 77-18-l(6)(a). 
11 
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00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Jeffery Russell Finlayson, 
Defendant and Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
FEB 1 k 2002 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000744-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 14, 2002) 
2002 UT App 36 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys Heather Johnson and Robert K. Heineman, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis. 
BENCH, Judge: 
"If a judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed or 
modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be 
executed." Utah R. App. P. 30(b). Because Defendant's 
convictions for rape and forcible sodomy were affirmed on appeal, 
the trial court may not have had jurisdiction to resentence 
Defendant. See, e.g., State v. Montova, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) ("To determine whether [defendant's] appeal of his 
resentencing is properly before this court, we must determine 
whether the initial sentence was valid. If it was valid, the 
trial court would have had no further subject matter jurisdiction 
to resentence [defendant]."). 
In any event, even if the trial court had jurisdiction to 
resentence, Defendant was not prejudiced by the court's failure 
to resolve inconsistencies between the trial testimony and the 
official version of the offense in the pre-sentence investigation 
report. Judge Wilkinson heard the evidence at trial and 
expressed a recollection of the trial evidence when he 
resentenced Defendant. The sentence imposed is fully consistent 
with both the evidence and the gravity of the offenses. 
Accordingly, the trial court's sentencing order is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
L jgL : 
20000744-CA 2 
